From
January 2003 to July 2004, Brazil received $3.2 billion in
loans from the World Bank and from the Inter-American
Development Bank.
During this same period, Brazilian public institutions
paid $6.9 billion to these banks.
In other words, Brazil sent abroad $3.7 billion more
than it received.
The
Counter-Agrarian Reform of the World Bank
* Marcelo
Resende and Maria Luisa Mendonça
In
recent decades, an idea was created in different parts of the
world that the rural territory was not significant for
development. The
processes of rural exodus were based in the image of urban
centres as the principal generators of income and economic
opportunities.
However,
the regions with major concentrations of natural resources –
such as water, land, minerals, and biodiversity – are in
rural areas, and have come to be the centre of the policies of
the multilateral financial agencies, especially the World
Bank. It is not
by chance that, today, the main projects of the Bank are
directed toward the countryside.
This
is the case of a recent loan by the World Bank of $505 million
already released and of $695 million to be released for
Brazil. The World
Bank generally supports projects that benefit large
businesses, such as the construction of a grain port in Santarém
(Pará) for the draining of soybeans exported by Cargill.
The project also includes the paving of roads linking
the state of Mato Grosso with Cargill’s port in Pará.
This policy stimulates environmental destruction in the
Amazon, where extensive areas of forest are being substituted
by areas of monoculture of soybeans and rice, by large-scale
cattle raising, and by clandestine timber companies.
Under
the pretext of ‘economic assistance’, the World Bank
influences the economic policies of the periphery countries.
To the extent to which the Bank demands matched funding
from governments, the State budgets become committed to the
financing of its projects.
From
January 2003 to July 2004, Brazil received $3.2 billion in
loans from the World Bank and from the Inter-American
Development Bank. During
this same period, Brazilian public institutions paid $6.9
billion to these banks. In
other words, Brazil sent abroad $3.7 billion more than it
received (Folha de São Paulo 08/04/2004).
In
Brazil, the ideology of the Bank has had its greatest impact
on the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), who
established an agrarian policy called “New Rural World”,
basically centred on three principles: (1) the settlement of
landless families as a compensatory social policy; (2) the
‘descentralization’ of the settlement projects; (3) the
substitution of the constitutional instrument of expropriation
by the propaganda of “land markets’.
During
the FHC government, the World Bank initiated three lines of
financing: Land Note (Cédula
da Terra), Land Bank (Banco
da Terra), and Land Credit to Combat Poverty (Credito
Fundiário de Combate à Pobreza).
This policy consists, basically, in the financing of
land purchases by workers, which becomes a debt to be paid in
twenty years. At
the same time, the large landowners are “rewarded” with
the lump-sum payment for their property. These programs
contradict the instrument of expropriation, mandated by the
Brazilian Constitution, which compensates landowners with
Titles of Agrarian Debt (TDAs
– Títulos
da Divida Agrária) over a period of twenty years.
In
the FHC government, these three lines of financing (Land Note,
Land Bank, and Land Credit to Combat Poverty) spent about R$
1.5 billion, and reached 74,585 families, as shown in the
Table below:
Finance
Line
|
Financing
(in
reais)
|
Period |
Number
of Families
|
Land
Note |
450
000 000
|
1997
– 2002
|
15
267
|
Land
Bank |
928
200 000
|
1998
– 2002
|
51
808
|
Land
Credit
|
19
600 000
|
2001
– 2003
|
7
510
|
Total
|
1
397 800 000
|
|
74
585
|
Sources:
Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA)/National Institute of
Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA)
NB:
These data are partial, since the MDA has not yet divulged the
complete data.
According
to research undertaken by academics and grassroots
organizations, these programs present the following problems:
·
Increase
in the cost of land and the lump-sum payment as a reward to
the landowners.
·
Economic
inviability, impossibility of payment of loans, and
indebtedness of rural workers.
The areas acquired, many of poor quality, do not
provide the conditions necessary for the generation of
sufficient wealth to pay down the debts.
·
Acquisition
of unregistered and unproductive lands, which are thus
suitable for agrarian reform programs.
·
Lands
are purchased by associations of workers, without autonomy in
the choice of the land. These
associations are many times organized by the landowners
themselves and by local politicians.
·
Precarious
conditions of survival and abandonment of the areas.
Instead of alleviating poverty, the financial situation
of the participants of the program worsened.
·
Complaints
of corruption involving municipal administrations, politicians
and unions, who were favoured in land purchase and sale
transactions
With
the beginning of the Lula government, the grassroots movements
in the countryside hoped that the World Bank projects will not
continue. The expectation was that agrarian reform would be at
the center of the political agenda, as a way to generate
employment, to guarantee food sovereignty and as the
foundation of a new development model.
Initially,
the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) announced the
suspension of the Land Bank program, and the evaluation of the
Land Credit program. As
of yet, this evaluation has not been released, and the program
was only temporarily suspended.
At
the moment, what we observe is the continuity and extension of
the World Bank policies for rural areas. In November 2003, the MDA announced the “National Plan for
Agrarian Reform: Pace, Production and Quality of Life in the
Countryside”. One
of the main goals of the plan, with a forecast of reaching
130,000 families, is the continuation of the Land Credit
program, which follows the logic of “land markets”.
In
the Lula government, the MDA maintained the administration of
the program within the National Secretariat for Agrarian
Reordering and came to call it the “National Program of Land
Credit”, with three lines of credit: Combating Rural
Poverty, Our First Land, and Consolidation of Family
Agriculture.
How was the FHC
Government’s Program and How is Lula’s Program?
Comparative
Table:
FHC’s
Administration
|
|
Lula’s
Administration
|
New
Rural World
|
=
|
National
Plan for Agrarian Reform
|
National
Secretariat for Agrarian Reform
|
=
|
National
Secretariat for Agrarian Reordering
|
Credit
System
|
=
|
National
Program of Land Credit
|
Credit
Lines:
1.
Land Note
2.
Land Bank
3.
Land Credit to Combat Poverty
|
=
|
Credit
Lines:
4.
Combating Poverty
5.
Our First Land
6.
Consolidation of Family Agriculture
|
As
we can observe, the Land Note, the Land Bank, and the Land
Credit of FHC’s administration are contained in the current
National Program of Land Credit of the MDA.
Only the names of the projects changed, which are now
called Combating Poverty, Our First Land, and Consolidation of
Family Agriculture.
In
other words, they are the same programs with only minor
changes, but the central idea of the ´land market´ remains
the same. According
to this notion, the State gives up its obligation to promote
the reduction of land concentration through redistribution of
land.
The
central problem of this policy is privatization of land, and
the replacement of Constitutional agrarian reform – based on
the expropriation of large landholdings that do not fulfill
their social function – with the propaganda of ‘land
markets’.
Up
till now, the government has not released an official
evaluation of the World Bank programs, and many questions
remain unanswered. For
example:
·
What
is the rate of default?
·
How
many people are unable to pay their debts and abandon their
land?
·
What
is the economic return of each project?
·
Is
the income obtained sufficient to pay back the loans, to pay
for the land, and for investments in production?
·
Has
an audit of these projects been carried out?
What is the result?
·
Have
the complaints of corruption presented by social organizations
been investigated? How
is the government going to respond?
·
What
is the situation of current defaults in relation to
contractual penalties?
Another
goal of the government’s plan, which aims to facilitate the
implementation of the ‘land markets’, is the registration
and geo-referencing the rural territory, with the
regularization of 2.2 million rural properties and the titling
of 500 000 leaseholders. This program eliminates the notion of
public and community lands, and could contribute to an
increase in concentration of land ownership.
Through
the sale of holdings, the titling process could benefit large
landholders and fraudulent claimholders, aside from
strengthening state governments in the concession of public
lands and kickbacks for loggers and large agribusinesses. In
the Amazon region and in the Savannas geo-referencing could
facilitate the privatization of land and the expansion of
monoculture on a massive scale.
The project also permits the World Bank to have access
to strategic data about land ownership in Brazil.
The
Brazilian territory contains an immense cultural and social
diversity, that includes community of acampados [people camped out in expectation of land redistribution]
and agrarian reform settlers, rural waged-workers, family
producers (sharecroppers, leaseholders and renters), owners of
tiny rural properties, traditional populations
(riverbank-dwellers, artesan fishers, quilombolas
[descendents of communities of escaped or freed slaves]),
indigenous peoples, people displaced by dams, and extractive
communities (gathering coconuts, rubbers), among others.
The
program of geo-referencing should focus on the demands of
grassroots movements in the countryside, with the
regularization of quilombo,
extractive and river communities, the acquisition of areas for
the resettlement of those displaced by dams, and the
demarcation of indigenous lands. It should also provide
leaseholders the right to use the land, with all of the social
and economic conditions assured, instead of the issuing of
land titles, which allow the sale and reconcentration of land.
In this way, leased land can be preserved as public
areas, for communal use.
Still
in relation to the proposal of geo-referencing the rural
territory, it would be easier and less onerous for the State
to establish a term in which all large landholders present
their productivity report, property registration, and the
surveyed area. In
this way, the burden of proof would be reversed, and would
become the responsibility of the landowners. The application
of such measure would affect only 70 thousand properties
larger than 1000 hectares, out of a total of more than 4
million properties. These
70 thousand properties make up 43.6 % of the total area
registered with INCRA.
In
spite of the fact that the National Plan for Agrarian Reform
gives priority to the policies of the World Bank, most
grassroots organizations hope that the Lula administration
will meet its commitment to bring about a broad agrarian
reform along constitutional lines. In order to do this, it’s
necessary to end the provisional measure that impedes the
expropriation of occupied land, and to establish a limit on
the size of rural properties in Brazil.
In
this context, it is incomprehensible that the responsibility
for the formulation of policies for the countryside, including
the use and occupation of land, would be delegated to an
international financial institution such as the World Bank.
It is essential to maintain public policies compatible
with the historic demands, the experiences, and the proposals
of grassroots movements who fight for land democratization and
for food sovereignty.
* Marcelo
Resende is a geographer, former president of INCRA (National
Institute of Colonization and Land Reform) and a member of the
Social Network for Justice and Human Rights.
** Maria
Luisa Mendonça is a journalist and director of the Social
Network for Justice and Human Rights (Rede Social de Justiça e Direitos Humanos).
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