The
failure of the Doha Round should serve to demystify certain
characteristics of the WTO.
One of these is the idea that the WTO as an institution
promotes “free trade.”
In reality, the main role of the WTO is to establish
mechanisms of control over the world market, through the
imposition of rules that make national development policies
impossible, in areas such as agriculture and industry.
The
Peoples’ Victory at the WTO
Maria
Luisa Mendonça
Despite
the insistence of some countries on saving the negotiations of
the so-called Doha Round at the World Trade Organization (WTO),
an agreement was impossible to reach.
The last chance happened on July 24th in Geneva, when
the Director-General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, recommended the
negotiations to be suspended.
The Minister of Industry of the Indian government,
Kamal Nath, was more emphatic, upon declaring that the Doha
Round was now “somewhere between intensive care and the
morgue.”
The
current phase of negotiations began in 2001, in the city of
Doha, Qatar, and should have concluded in 2004.
But, even before this period, the WTO had already been
suffering from a practically chronic lack of legitimacy.
The same type of impasse had been occurring since the
failure of the Millennium Round, marked by huge protests in
Seattle (USA), in November of 1999.
After
Seattle, it was difficult for the WTO to find a ‘safe’
venue to host their reunions, facing large mobilizations from
civil society each time.
For this reason, the ministerial reunion of 2001 took
place in Qatar, a small country in the Persian Gulf, where
protestors could be easily repressed.
In
2003, conservative sectors considered the ministerial meeting
of the WTO in Cancun, México a failure, while social
movements considered it a success. The slogan of the movements
that organized the protests was “Derail the WTO”— and,
it really happened.
In
all of the impasses of the WTO, the same motives can be found.
The industrialized countries do not accept fair rules
while the countries of the periphery strategically resist
certain points of negotiation.
Another fundamental factor is the visibility of
movements in opposition to the WTO, that, beyond mobilizations,
also produce critical reports about the impacts of trade
agreements.
Since
the beginning of the Uruguay Round of negotiations in 1995,
the WTO has functioned much like a global legislative body,
with one objective: to favor large corporations by imposing a
series of rules to open markets, in detriment to fundamental
rights such as work, health, education, protection of the
environment, and food security.
Many
policies proposed within the WTO have been implemented through
bilateral or regional commercial agreements and through
measures imposed by multilateral financial institutions such
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
However, the advancement of the Doha Round could lead
to the deepening of policies that make it more difficult for
countries to opt for another model of development, based on
national interests and on peoples self-determination.
Despite its discourse on “development,” the
policies defended within the WTO are based on the deregulation
of strategic sectors, which, throughout history, have
guaranteed the well-being of society.
The
failure of the Doha Round should serve to demystify certain
characteristics of the WTO.
One of these is the idea that the WTO as an institution
promotes “free trade.” In reality, the main role of the WTO is to establish
mechanisms of control over the world market, through the
imposition of rules that make national development policies
impossible, in areas such as agriculture and industry.
Another
myth is the supposed multilateral nature of the WTO.
Facing the recent suspension of Doha Round negotiations,
the Director-General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, affirmed that
“we lost a very important opportunity to show that
multilateralism works.”
In
practice, few of the 149 member countries of the WTO
participate effectively in the negotiations.
The majority of governments lack the conditions to
maintain representatives in Geneva, where the headquarters of
the WTO is located. What’s
more, additional means of exclusion exist, such as the
creation of a group of “most interested” countries, or G6,
which holds closed-door meetings in order to impose their
positions. This
group is formed by the United States, the European Union,
Japan, Australia, Brazil, and India.
Under
the slogan of “free trade,” the WTO seeks to interfere in
many sectors, in addition to commercial policies.
Their agreements include the imposition of patent laws
or “intellectual property” which, among other things,
impedes access to medicines for the poorest, and favors the
control of seeds and biotechnology by large corporations.
The agreements on “services” defended within the
WTO seek to privatize basic rights such as health, education,
and social security, as well as promoting the monopoly
privatization of strategic sectors such as transportation,
postal service, water, energy, and telecommunications.
The
debate within the WTO about tariff reduction of
non-agricultural products excludes an important factor.
In reality, for many non-industrialized countries,
import tariffs mean significant sources of income, since they
function as taxes on the profits made by foreign businesses in
their markets. Many
times, these tariffs represent the largest source of
investment countries can make in infrastructure and essential
services. In
relation to countries that are characterized as “emerging,”
or that have some significant industrial structure, the
proposal of tariff reduction within the WTO could mean the
impossibility of countries continuing to employ development
strategies in these sectors.
Despite
the constant circulation of diverse “myths,” the WTO
continues to face a grave crisis of credibility.
In the end, there are only two possibilities for
governments to reach an agreement: (1) if the countries of the
“center,” such as the United States and the European Union,
abstain from protectionist measures for their industries,
agriculture, and economies; or (2) if the countries of the
“periphery” accept the impositions of the WTO and abdicate
from sovereign models of development.
No
one should really believe that the first option would happen.
However, in relation to the second possibility, we hope
that the governments of our countries listen to the
manifestations of civil society.
--
Maria Luisa Mendonça is a journalist and member of the Social
Network for Human Rights and Justice
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